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Abstract 
 
Georgia and Turkey has become important partners in the Caucasus region after independence of Georgia in 
1991. Two countries preferred to follow pro-West policies in their foreign policy against Russian factor. They 
have geopolitical importance and geostrategic location for Russia throughout history. This article analyzes 
foreign policies of Georgia and Turkey and examines Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline as a common 
foreign policy between them. The paper found out that this kind of projects between Georgia and Turkey 
would make them important actors rising from regional level to global level in the future. 
 
Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline, Georgian Foreign Policy, 
Russia, geopolitical importance 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Georgia is one of the important actors in the Caucasus and South Caucasus. Its 
geographical and geostrategic location make it significant player for the Caucasus and the 
world. Especially, after the demise of Soviet Union, its importance is getting more 
understandable for the West. Russian Federation as a neighboring state of Georgia started 
to intervene in the Caucasus and Georgia. Russia intensified the conflicts between 
Abkhazia-Georgia and South Ossetia-Georgia by supporting the breakaway regions. This 
situation pushed Georgia to follow pro-western solutions and policies for Georgian foreign 
policy. Hence, Georgia started to arrange its policies compatible with the western 
institutions. And it announced its desire to integrate into NATO and the EU. By the way, 
Turkey was first included in the Caucasus after the collapse of USSR by recognizing newly 
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independent states in the region. Then, it used the ethnic roots with Azerbaijan to be 
included in the region. Turkey used important discourses such as status quo policy, 
territorial integration policy and so forth. These discourses made Turkey and Georgia closer 
partners within similar interests and goals in the region. Georgia-Turkey has established 
important pipeline projects to provide energy transportation from Caspian region to the 
west without Russia and Iran. In these projects, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey have 
significant position for the Western countries. And these countries, especially Turkey and 
Georgia maintained their aspirations for the integration with the Western institutions –the 
EU aspiration for Turkey, NATO and the EU aspirations for Georgia.  
 Georgia-Turkey foreign affairs on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline made 
them significant players in the region and world policy. Therefore, locations of the 
countries affected and are still affecting both countries foreign policies via BTC pipeline 
project. Furthermore, Georgia-Turkey foreign affairs would lead them toward being 
important actors from regional level to global level in the near future. 
 
GEORGIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 Georgia has a short history as an independent state after the fall of USSR. Georgia 
has had a complicated and problematic past since it became independent. At the same time, 
it is a reality that it is a weak and small country. It has a difficult neighborhood position 
with Iran, Russia and Turkey which are nervous about each other’s activities in the South 
Caucasus (MacFarlane, 2012). It can be stated that Georgia was surrounded by nervous 
relations’ network after independence.  
Furthermore, Georgia has an importance location in the Caucasus region which is 
“bounded by Russia in the North, Turkey in the Southwest, Armenia in the Southeast, 
Azerbaijan in the East and Black Sea on the West” (Kaeter 2004, 105). Russia is seen as a 
threat for Georgians because of intervention of Russia to Georgian territory. By the way, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia are neighboring states of Georgia. Turkey and Black Sea are 
important gates for Georgia that opens to the West. Turkey is also important partner for 
Georgia. 
Georgia had a series of problems after independence. Weak and powerless state 
structure of Georgia was on the top of the most important issues which caused the state to 
face a fragmented Georgia issue and separatists and ethnic group in its territory (Burke, 
2009). There are more than 100 ethnic groups, including large groups of Armenians, 
Russians, Azerbaijani, Abkhaz, Ossets and Adjarians among 5 million population of 
Georgia. So that, it experienced difficult transition period after taking its freedom from 
Soviet Unions (Kaeter, 2004). This multi-ethnicity is a result of the geopolitical location of 
Georgia and the Caucasus.  
On the other side, Georgia faced a number of crises in point of economic transition, 
setting a rule of law, creating civil society and democratic political culture as many post-
Soviet states did after independence. Especially, it was in a struggle or fight with three 
regions including Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjara. Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain 
in their struggle with Georgia to be independent (Burke, 2009). These two regions take 
place in the north of Georgia. Russia supports them against Georgian government. This 
remaining struggle changes economy, security, democracy and foreign policy of Georgia.  
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An important feature of geopolitical location of Georgia is to be on the Great Silk 
Road. So, Great Silk Road started to function in the II century B.C. which connected China 
to the Western countries. One route of this road crossing the Caspian Sea was connected 
with the Caucasus, passed through Georgia and from Phasis (Poti) by the Black Sea 
reached Byzantium and Rome (Asatiani, 2011).  
The Russian negative influences on the region caused ethnic conflicts in Georgia 
such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, and the conflict over a region between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh conflict (Nichol, 2010). So, Russian policy 
over the region is still working by causing the conflicts among the region states because 
Russia sees Georgia and other regional countries as part of close foreign policy and sphere 
of influence after collapse of USSR.  
Georgia’s foreign policy motivation, overwhelmed by regional clashes and strained 
relations with Russia over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechnya, moved toward more 
conspicuous integration with the EU and NATO. This motivation resulted in a proposed 
article in 2000, which highlighted joining into Western establishments. What profoundly 
propagated Georgia’s swing toward the West was the Transcaucasian energy corridor, or 
Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline (Jones and Kakhishvili, 2013).  
Turkey continues to be Georgia’s “strategic partner” through collaborating over a 
railway project (the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad), which will advance commerce and 
tourism activities by rail from Asia to Europe, bypassing Armenia and evading Russian 
domain. Georgian-Turkish relations, despite the suspicions of Georgian people on the 
objects of Turkish investment and a long history of shared doubt, depend on common 
financial and strategic concentration (Jones and Kakhishvili, 2013). 
Georgian foreign policy researches on some key points including the economy, 
political culture, national minorities, public opinion, institutional structures and authority in 
Georgia. Particularly, economy is a vital marker that influences the foreign policy. Georgia 
has self-capability to address and decide on its own particular interior vulnerabilities, 
monetary security for its subjects, and social administrations, for example, wellbeing, 
natural and pension supports. Georgia’s interior social and political emergencies were 
personally associated with fizzled monetary approaches and affected noticeably its capacity 
to seek after remote arrangement objectives (Jones and Kakhishvili, 2013). For example, 
the NATO and the EU are interested in economically successful democracy because 
Georgia should integrate with similar institutions whose interests and values are same with 
the West (Georgia’s Security Challenges And Policy Recommendations, 2012). 
Georgia occupies strategic location at an important geopolitical juncture between 
South East Europe, the Black Sea littoral, the Caspian Basin, and the Middle East though it 
has no important natural sources in the South Caucasus (Georgia’s Security Challenges 
And Policy Recommendations, 2012). When its location is considered, Georgia has to face 
significant security risks by depending on domestic situation, regional instability which has 
important results, an important regional power, an unwillingness of Euro-Atlantic actors to 
take significant risks, and significant vulnerability to global economic risks (MacFarlane, 
2012). Hence, Georgia has also important concepts for keeping its important positions, 
maintaining its foreign policy and consolidating its state structure against internal and 
external interventions or strives. 
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For instance, the National Security Concept, Georgia’s national values are arrayed 
that: 
 Sovereignty and territorial integrity that determine  nonintervention to 
Georgia’s internal policy, and its recognition as an independent state in 
international relations 
 Freedom of citizens’ social and political rights, 
 Democracy and the rule of law that emphasize democracy and supreme of law 
in the country, 
 Security for country and its institutions, and citizens’ security within 
international recognized borders, 
 Prosperity that underlines granted basic human rights, and provided economic 
freedom, 
 Peace that is included in the ensured regional and international security and 
stability of freedom, independence, unity, development and peace of Georgia. 
(National Security Concept of Georgia, n.d) 
 
These values show that Georgia’s almost all national values contradict with Russian 
behaviors against Georgia. 20 percent of Georgian territory is occupied by Russia within 
stationed 10.000 troops (Georgia’s Security Challenges And Policy Recommendations, 
2012) Moreover, Nika Chitadze (2012) summarizes these points that “the concept pays 
attention to fundamental national values for Georgia such as independence, freedom, 
democracy and rule of law, prosperity, peace and security. Firstly, Georgia rejects 
interventions of any state in its territory and domestic affairs. Secondly, it guarantees 
human rights and freedoms for individuals and groups residing on its territory. Thirdly, it 
provides peace in the country by using democratic rules and the law, and arranging political 
system of Georgia. The last, Georgian state institution makes regulations in economy and 
rules for Georgia’s prosperity and security”. This situation proves that sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, freedom, security, prosperity and peace are under threat for Georgia. 
So, Russia violated Georgian national values. 
Georgia has national interests within national values in the concept. National 
security considers independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of people to develop 
national values and interests in the context of constitutional order in a state governed by 
rule of law. These values and points are very important for a country’s foreign policy 
principles and priorities. In other words, national security interests are the key concepts for 
the foreign policy of countries (Chitadze, 2012). 
Some of these principles seek Georgia’s security and policy. These can be summarized as; 
 Especially, future of NATO, its partners and its aspirants should be made clear 
by NATO. Georgia is ambitious to integrate into NATO because of security 
issues in the region. In case of any decline of NATO, Georgia may negatively be 
affected. 
 Economic development, democracy, and security issues must be recovered for 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions of Georgia.  
 A membership in an effective collective defense organization will provide 
Georgia to feel more secure in its region where rapid changes exist. Moreover, 
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membership of NATO as a collective defense organization help relations of 
Georgia and Russia improved.  
 Self-defense and military capabilities have to be enhanced to NATO’s standards 
with well-educated armed forces (Georgia’s Security Challenges And Policy 
Recommendations, 2012). 
 
Security issue is one of the most important problems influencing Georgian existence 
as an independent state in international relations. Particularly, its neighboring states cause 
this security issue. So, integration into NATO and other organizations will make relations 
between Georgia and its neighboring states easier, especially with Russian Federation. In 
short, Georgia’s vital surroundings incorporate a rapidly changing political scene, fast 
technological changes, differing qualities of potential enemies and constrained military 
capabilities (Chitadze, 2012). Enhancing military capabilities, educated armed forces, 
integration with security organizations, analyzing environment and adversaries are key 
points for Georgia.  
On the other side, defense policy as an important branch of foreign policy has some 
priorities compatible with national security policy. These priorities include followings:   
 Prevention of and protection from direct aggression 
 NATO integration and international cooperation 
 Ability to asses strategic environment policy 
 Provide stability in the Caucasus region 
 Contribution to the international security environment (Chitadze, 2012). 
 
According to National Security Concept of Georgia, nation’s security, stability and 
significant role in the whole region depend on Georgia’s membership of NATO. It is 
believed that NATO is going to guarantee these to Georgia. In addition, all reforms related 
to NATO membership help to strengthen the country’s democratic institutions and foster its 
defense capabilities. Even any military aggression of Russian federation wouldn’t change 
Georgia’s path toward democratic developments and NATO integration. Otherwise, not 
only Georgia needs NATO’s contribution to Georgia’s future but also NATO will have an 
active partner to share responsibility of collective security for international missions. For 
instance, to be participant of International Security Force in Afghanistan is a really 
important example for this (National Security Concept of Georgia).  
While NATO incorporation contains some portion of security arrangement and 
improvement for Georgia, the EU is identified as part of country’s political and monetary 
advancement for Georgia. The integration of Georgia with the EU bolsters fair 
establishments, security, and also financial coordination with the EU. Henceforth, 
expanding institutional structures of participation with the EU is vital also for Georgia. It 
considers the European Neighborhood Arrangement and Eastern Organization as vital 
factors adding to Georgia’s integration into the EU. In the meantime, Georgia foresees 
more dynamic EU inclusion to resolve the Russian-Georgian clashes. It is essential that the 
EU and different members of the international community have perceived the control of 
Georgian occupation by the Russian Federation. Subsequently, Georgia appreciates 
resolution to this influence of the European Parliament received on November 17, 2011 
(National Security Concept of Georgia). 
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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Turkey has a wide relation network on the map because of its geography, 
geostrategic and geopolitical position, and history. Turkey has followed pro-west policies 
during its existence after the World War II. Since it has struggled with Russia throughout 
history, it has taken part in the West Block during and after the Cold War. Relations with 
international organizations and institutions were based on the Euro-Atlantic developments. 
It kept its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the forefront of its foreign policy. 
Regarding the fact that Turkey’s relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia are important 
chances for Turkey to be an effective power in the region. Turkey was seen as a regional 
power which comprises an area from the North Caucasus to Persian Gulf and from Adriatic 
to Great Wall by the world leaders after the collapse of Soviet Union (Çelikpala, 2010). 
The main factors that affect the Caucasus policy of Turkey are to provide and 
support independent political and economic stability, peace and cooperation, and pro-
western values in the region. Moreover, keeping and recognizing independency and 
territorial integrity of the former republics is the primary policy for Turkey. So, Turkey has 
recognized almost all independent states of former Soviet republics and started diplomatic 
relations with them except Armenia (Çelikpala, 2010). While Turkey making these real, it 
was highly careful not to provoke Russian Federation in the first contact with the Caucasus 
states because of the risks caused by Russian aggressive policy toward Turkey (Punsmann, 
2011). 
Turkish Foreign Policy was constituted on two obligatory reasons which influence 
all alternatives of foreign policy. These are Turkey’s geography and long-standing ties with 
the neighboring states. These two sensible elements gave Turkey the role of a key local 
security player in the Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions (I. Turkey’s Perspectives and Policies on Security 
Issues) 
Turkey should have the capacity to utilize a more extensive mixture of military, 
financial, social and political approaches in a superior coordination to go up against 
contemporary security challenges. At the end of the day, Turkey expected to utilize a 
“thorough methodology” to experience today’s security (I. Turkey’s Perspectives and 
Policies on Security Issues). Consequently, it began to follow the westbound remote 
strategy after World War II and targeted close, profound and escalated participation with 
the West. Thus, it is a member of NATO from 1952 to present, and a candidate state for the 
EU (Doster, 2012). 
Turkey is located on a geopolitical place at the crossing point of Europe, Asia and 
Africa, in the region of important commercial lines, energy corridors and controversial 
areas, in particular the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. (Udum, 2007). This affected 
Turkish foreign policy as a source of positive and negative influence. Turkey is not only an 
Asian and a European country but only a Balkan, a Mediterranean, a Middle East, a Black 
Sea and a Caucasus country according to its strategic position (Sener, 2013). On the other 
hand, Turkey’s location gives a particular focal status which contrasts from other central 
nations like Germany, Russia or Iran. Turkey holds an ideal spot since it is both an Asian 
and a European country and is also near Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean.  
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As far as history, society and its region of impact, according to Davutoglu, Turkey 
is a Central Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and 
Black Sea nation (Kozakou-Marcoullis, 2009).  
Republic of Turkey has anxiety on security depending on geographical and 
historical realities of the country. This anxiety means to keep and carry on Turkey’s 
sovereignty to eliminate threats towards it. Moreover, anxiety of security comprises its 
existing geography and geopolitical/geostrategic legacy coming from Ottoman Empire. 
Turkey has Bosporus and the Dardanelles as strategic points which make Turkey important 
globally. On the other hand, international borders of Turkey also cause anxiety of security 
for Turkey because Turkey can feel naturally insecure in international relations as a result 
of large numbers of borders (Sener, 2013). And, Turkey shares its borders with Bulgaria 
and Greece in the West side of Turkey; Georgia, Armenia and Iran in the East side of 
Turkey; and Syria and Iraq in the Southeast side (Udum, 2007). And Russian Federation is 
also Turkey’s neighbor which is linked with Black Sea border in the Northern part of 
Turkey.   
Besides, while Turkey have realized the importance of its location and feel anxiety 
over its security, it is as yet looking for a higher global and local status, which is tried to be 
accomplished by joining the EU and serving the Euro-Atlantic group as a fundamental 
transit and social-civilizational “bridge” between the East and the West. In the long term, 
Ankara moves in the direction of joining the group of big “players” in charge of the 
European nations’ energy security and expansion of energy resources for the EU, which 
represents the arrangements to unite the Caucasus and Central Asia into a solitary energy 
transportation framework that would extend Europe via Turkey (Yuldasheva 2008, 52). 
Military capacity influences Turkey’s diplomatic and political relations, and usage 
of security parameters in international community. So, it has significant military capacity 
with regard to main weapon systems, number of military personals, level of education, 
operation ability and mobilization system. In fact, one of the most important reasons for 
Turkey to have significant developments in military capacity is that crisis and conflicts in 
the Balkans, Middle East and the Caucasus influence foreign and security policy of Turkey. 
Any risk, threat or challenge in Greece, Armenia, or Syria can easily affect Turkey’s 
policies as well. Otherwise, Turkey has relations with the Euro-Atlantic organizations as a 
provider of security and stability opposite to the position of consumer of stability and 
security in the Euro-Atlantic region (Sener, 2013).  
It has been clarified that Turkey’s national interests and foreign policy are affected 
by some specific subjects. Anxiety on security, military capacity and geostrategic location 
are the most important factors that lead Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey has relations with 
pro-western organizations because of its territorial importance in international relations. Its 
location helped Turkey enhance its military capacity to get rid of anxiety on security 
because of a series of international borders and neighboring states. It joined the NATO 
against the East Block during and after World War II.  
Turkish foreign policy principles were arrayed by Davutoglu that: 
There should be a balance between security and democracy in a country in order to 
be able to establish an area of influence in its environment, so Turkish foreign policy 
should focus on this, 
 Zero problem with neighbor states’ policy is inside of this principles to set 
important foreign policy, 
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 Enhancing relations with neighboring regions to be in those regions as Turkey 
became active in the Balkans, in the Middle East, in the Caucasus and in Central 
Asia. Hence, Turkey should use any chance within institutions or organizations 
in those regions, 
 Adherence to multi-dimensional policy whereby with other important actors 
aims to be a modifier, not a competitor, 
 A proactive foreign policy would make future clear for Turkey’s steps in its 
policies (Kozakou-Marcoullis, 2009). 
 
Turkish Security and Defense Policy as part of Turkish Foreign Policy have 
historically concentrated on regional cooperation, contribution to peace and security in its 
region, and alliance with international and regional organizations (Defence and Security 
Policy of the Turkish Republic, 2011). As Ataturk who is the founder of Republic of 
Turkey declared “Peace at home, peace in the world”, the declaration has become the center 
of foreign policy priorities. 
According to Sener (2013) “there are three basic principles and functions in Turkish 
Foreign Policy: to be supporter of status quo, to be pro-western and to be pragmatist and 
realist in foreign policy”. Turkey has never been an expansionist state, and it doesn’t 
demand or want to be shaped by borders. In the other words, it is not a revisionist state. 
Additionally, Turkey has not joined any war except Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 since 
the declaration of Republic of Turkey. It has tried to be dynamic in near geography and 
follow global and regional balance (Doster, 2012). Especially, its borders and geography 
pushed it to be dynamic in the region because almost all developments in its close 
neighbors have easily influenced Turkish foreign policy. In spite of all of these, Turkey as a 
supporter of status quo follows two important points in its foreign policy. These are 
carrying on existing borders and maintaining existing balance in its international relations. 
Moreover, Turkish Foreign Policy implemented balance policy in two different ways. First 
is to attempt to set a balance between the West and anti-west. Second is to attempt to 
provide a balance among all factors which comprise the West. For instance, Turkey has 
rested on the Soviet Russia against the West between 1920 and 1936. Other example is that 
it rested on Great Britain against fascist Italy between 1936 and 1945 years, and resting on 
the USA against Soviet Russia threat from 1946 to present (Sener, 2013).  
Turkey is seeking the EU membership because Turkey will constitute a true asset 
for the Union, with its geostrategic location, large economic potential, educated and 
dynamic population and with its visionary and multidimensional foreign policy. Turkey’s 
accession to the EU will bring an added value to the Union, not a burden. Carrying this 
relationship forward with the ultimate goal of membership is a strategic importance for 
both Turkey and the EU (Turkey-EU Relations, n.d.). The contemporary Turkey aspires to 
join the EU as a full member and to be a leading economic and political actor in Eurasia. It 
envisages an international mission that is no longer peripheral and confined to the outskirts 
of Europe. Our mission envisions a pivotal role in the emerging Eurasian reality (Cem, 
2013). 
Considering these, Turkey needs to have good relations with a lot of country and 
states for its interests. During and after cold war, Turkey has security and territorial 
integrity anxieties because of the East Block or Russian expansionism policy toward 
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Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey’s geopolitical and geographical location shows that political 
order after the Cold War provided many new independent states to be reappeared or 
reconfirmed by international arena. Moreover, almost all these “new” states - in the 
Balkans, in the Caucasus or in Central Asia - have mutual history, religion or language with 
Turkey. This provides Turkey to set a new international environment of historical and 
cultural dimensions in these regions (Cem, 2013). Hence, Turkey’s anxieties couldn’t 
prevent its role in these regions. Turkey can help them and develop itself by being members 
of the international organizations. While these organizations assist Turkey to keep itself 
from threats, they make Turkey a key figure in these regions. 
As mentioned above, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, 
Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country, so it has to be interested in the 
developments and organizations related to these regions in foreign policy. Briefly, 
international organizations in foreign policy provide links to Turkey to be in touch with 
those regions. Turkey can gain its interests via organizations. These organizations mean 
cooperation among the regions and countries. Security-based organizations make wars 
difficult among states, while economic-based organizations or unions make economy and 
prosperity enhanced among countries, even regions. Most of them provide prosperity, 
peace, democracy, liberalist economy, free market economy, security and rule of law for 
each state which is members of them.  
Turkey should be careful in its foreign policy toward the South Caucasus since this 
region has historical richness and diversity, and economic potential and opportunity within 
the possible conflicts. Especially, natural gas and oil reserves make the region significant 
for Russia and the rest of the world within the rivalries on the opportunities in the region. 
The South Caucasus realized itself as a strategic juncture between the East and the West as 
other powers did because it is a key transit route for energy and resources from Central 
Asia to the West (Hampson, 2013) via BTC and other pipeline projects. 
 
GEORGIA-TURKEY COMMON PROJECT:  
BAKU-TBILISI-CEYHAN CRUDE OIL PIPELINE 
 
In the world which is getting more global, demands for energy is rising by shaping 
not only economic policies but also strategic policies of the countries. For this reason, 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline is established for transportation of Caspian Oil to 
the west and the world. This project constitutes the most important part of the East-West 
energy corridor. Geopolitical importance of Turkey would increase and Georgia would be 
in the forefront as an important transition country in the world (Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan HPBH 
Proje Direktorlugu). 
The vital significance of the district has expanded with local undertakings, for 
example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Unrefined petroleum Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum (BTE) Normal Gas Pipeline, and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad. Subsequently, 
Suleymanov (2013) states that:  
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil, and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines do 
not just give a noteworthy access to Caspian hydrocarbons and establish the 
framework for the East-West transportation hall but they also put Turkey in 
a position on the world map as a critical transition point for vitality assets. 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, Blue Stream and Baku-Tbilisi-
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Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline projects are significant and geopolitical 
projections of the region. These projects provide Turkey to become second 
important actor in the Eurasian energy corridor (Usul, 2013).  
 
Especially, BTC is the cornerstone of Turkey’s policy toward South Caucasus 
(Punsmann, 2011) since the route and construction of this project is planned according to 
regional balances and relations with Turkey’s allies and their policies. Moreover, this 
provided to set up a regional balance based on Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia by supplying 
energy to western markets (Çelikpala, 2010).  
Despite the fact that BTE and Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad are critical to Georgia, the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline venture is more vital for Georgia financially as well as 
politically. At the point when BTC pipeline undertaking was imagined, Georgia had a 
progression of obstructions to tackle in the local and global nature. These were the 
shortcoming of the state, corruption, and Russia’s approach towards Georgia (Papava, 
2005). 
Meanwhile, Papava (2005) states that BTC will produce “monetary advantages and 
open doors for an upgraded personal satisfaction for those whom our business effects”. 
Bearing this in mind, specific goals of investment programs in Georgia are as follows: 
 Improved economic opportunities and increased incomes;  
 A developed and improved agricultural sector;  
 Enhancement of the quality of life by means of revitalized social infrastructure;  
 Improved ability of communities to take independent initiatives, organize and 
manage social development.  
 
When it is considered in the setting of geopolitical sense, Georgia’s area is the 
hugest for the South Caucasus, particularly if one considers the contention between the two 
different countries of the location: Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia has picked pro-
Western strategies for its geostrategic significance (Papava, 2005). 
BTC pipeline adds to the development of Georgia’s part in both the Black Sea and 
the Caspian regions. In the meantime, fruitful abuse of its transitional capacity later on will 
rely on irreversibility of fair changes, and predictable compatibility of the technique of 
incorporation with the European and Transoceanic associations (Papava, 2005). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Geopolitical and geostrategic locations of Georgia and Turkey pushed them to set 
important relations and policies toward the west. Especially, Russian aggression and 
intervention to Georgian territory were important reasons for Georgia’s pro-western 
policies. Turkey had similar issues with Russia. Turkey has also anxiety on security as a 
result of Russian expansionist behaviors. Turkey has important channels that make Turkey 
globally important. Hence, it has joined to NATO to provide security against Russia and 
other revisionist states. Georgia has followed the integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions 
while Turkey is following the EU membership. Furthermore, BTC project has been an 
important opportunity for two countries. 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 3, No. 2, 2017 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 
            
 
52 
 
Turkey should be careful in its foreign policy toward the South Caucasus since this 
region has historical richness and diversity, and economic potential and opportunity within 
the possible conflicts. Especially, natural gas and oil reserves make this region significant 
for Russia and the rest of the world who can rival on the opportunities in the region. The 
South Caucasus realized itself as a strategic juncture between the East and the West as 
other powers did because it is a key transit route for energy and resources from Central 
Asia to the West via BTC and other pipeline projects. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has found a space to develop its 
relations with the Caucasian states including Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey started to set 
good relations with these states by respecting their territorial integrity and independency. 
Georgia has a border with Turkey and shares similar anxieties with Turkey in foreign 
policy.  
Moreover, Georgia and Turkey have similar priorities in their foreign policies such 
as the integration into the western institutions. While Turkey as a member of NATO is 
waiting for the membership of the EU, Georgia has also aspirations for both NATO and the 
EU. This kind of factors and similarities provided two countries and Azerbaijan to have 
close relations with each other. As a natural result of this, BTC pipeline was established 
between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan to transport the oil and natural gas from Central 
Asia and the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus to the West without Russia and Iran. Within 
this pipeline project, aspirations of Azerbaijan and Georgia have increased to set relations 
with the West. In addition to this, Turkey was important figure for these two countries to 
connect them to the West since Russian Federation has started to be effective in the region 
after the fall of Soviet Union to struggle with external actors. However, Turkey’s status quo 
policy ensured to gain Georgia’s trust in foreign policy, especially in economic relations 
with Turkey. Russian aggression toward Georgia intervened and supported the breakaway 
regions against Georgian government.  
In conclusion, while Georgia is the key figure in the South Caucasus, Turkey has 
important partners in the Caucasus for its energy and economic needs. Furthermore, BTC 
pipeline may be considered as an important step for the European energy security. Besides, 
it can be evaluated as a good chance or policy for Georgia, as a potential candidate for 
membership for Euro-Atlantic institutions in the near future. Georgia and Turkey are 
important partners in the regions. This partnership would provide stability in the Caucasus 
and important cooperation between Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan based on economic, 
politic and security concerns. Especially, Georgia-Turkey relations regulate the issues 
between Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan by making Georgia as a transition 
country between Armenia and Turkey.  
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